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Parent, Child, Husband, Wife:
When Recognition Fails, Tragedy Ensues
Scott FitzGibbon*
“Dost know thy lineage? Nay, thou know’st it not,
And all unwitting art a double foe
To thine own kin, the living and the dead . . . .”
Teiresias, in Oedipus the King1
I. INTRODUCTION
Recognition, according to Aristotle’s Poetics, is one of the three
parts of tragedy.2 Greek drama often presents an extended course of
recognition, reflects its psychological consequences, and makes it a
central element in the downfall of the tragic hero. That is the case, for
example, with Oedipus. Recognition may also be a crucial stage—a
central project—in the development of a society, and failure of recognition a dimension of its deterioration. Any society, to cohere and
flourish, must recognize, respect, and encourage the affiliational structures that weave its fabric. All fair social orders recognize the special
character of minority groups.3 Recognition is also an element in legal
thought, since the law must identify and define social categories and
relationships as a basis for doctrine. The law would poorly promote
*

J.D., Harvard. B.C.L., Oxford. Professor, Boston College Law School. Copyright 2011 by
Scott FitzGibbon.
1
SOPHOCLES, Oedipus the King, in SOPHOCLES 1, 41, lines 416–18 (E. Capps et al. eds.,
F. Storr trans., William Heinemann 1912) (Loeb Classical Library No. 20) [hereinafter Oedipus
the King (Storr trans.)]. This translation places a semi-colon at the end of the lines quoted above.
The sentence continues:
Aye and the dogging curse of mother and sire
One day shall drive thee, like a two-edged sword,
Beyond our borders, and the eyes that now
See clear shall see henceforward endless night.
Id. at 41, lines. 418–20.
2
See ARISTOTLE, Poetics, in II COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2316, 2324 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., I. Baywater trans., Oxford University Press 1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, Poetics].
To be more precise, recognition is here identified as one of the three parts of the plot of tragedy.
3
See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (reporting the opinion that
“[e]veryone should be recognized for his or her unique identity”).
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civil society if it misunderstood and mischaracterized its components.
This article briefly notes some developments in the law and society of our present age regarding the understanding—the recognition—of
marriage, fatherhood, motherhood, and the family. The article warns
against a certain casualness, a confusion, perhaps even a certain promiscuity of thought, that has occasionally emerged in the law. Drawing
on Sophocles’ drama Oedipus the King and on the scriptural narrative
of David and Bathsheba, the article investigates what might be called
the “moral location” of the activity of recognition. It proposes that
recognition of basic family forms is a process with a deep dimension.
It apprehends that failure of recognition in such matters may sow the
seeds of social tragedy.
II. AN INSTANCE OF CONFUSION AS TO RECOGNITION
Scholars of modern family law will be able to identify many instances in which recognition of basic familial roles has been occluded
or confused, and many more in which the subject has been treated superficially, as though a legislative subcommittee or a court of first impression could reconstruct basic familial affiliational concepts with the
same brisk procedures as might be otherwise applied in adjudicating or
revising provisions of a tax code. This section lays out one example.
Ontario law now recognizes certain people who are not married to
one another as nevertheless spouses.4 This doctrinal misadventure has
introduced uncertainty into the meaning of the term “spouse,” and has
led to legal doctrines that diverge from social understandings and
which embarrass doctrinal development, as will here be explained.
The Ontario Family Law Act provides that “‘spouse’ . . . includes
either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited . . . continuously for a period of not less than three years . . .
.”5 Leading cases leave Ontario law fluid as to the meaning of the
4

The discussion of Ontario law in this and the following paragraphs closely follows the
discussion in Scott FitzGibbon, “Just Like Little Dogs”: The Law Should Speak with Veracity
and Respect, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 107,
136–39 (Scott FitzGibbon, Lynn D. Wardle & A. Scott Loveless eds., 2010).
5
Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, § 29 (“In this Part, . . . ‘spouse’ means a spouse
as defined in subsection 1 (1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited, (a) continuously for a period of not less than three years,
or (b) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a
child.”). Section One provides that “‘cohabit’ means to live together in a conjugal relationship,
whether within or outside marriage” and that “‘spouse’ means either of two persons who, (a) are
married to each other, or (b) have together entered into a marriage that is voidable or void, in
good faith on the part of a person relying on this clause to assert any right.”
Several other Ontario provisions define “spouse” in unusual ways, as cited and described
in an appendix to Rosenberg v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, [2006], 216 O.A.C. 358, at
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term “spouse.” In the case of Mahoney v. King, the court identified
seven definitional factors, each with subparts amounting to twenty-two
in the aggregate.6 Not included among these components was any oath
or pledge or assurance that the parties might have made to one another. There was no reference to a duty to love,7 honor or cherish.
Loyalty was not specified as a requirement.8 Exclusivity was not mentioned.
Ontario law has endorsed the conclusion that you can be one person’s spouse at the same time that you are married to someone else. In
Sullivan v. Letnik,9 an Ontario court held that a cohabiting couple had
established spousal status even though one member was married to
another person.10 In Mahoney, an Ontario court endorsed, as sufficiently meritorious to go to trial, Sandra Mahoney’s assertion that she
was her ex-lover’s “spouse,” even though he was married to another
woman during the affair and continued throughout to live with his
wife. The court observed that “[i]ssues relating to the definition of
spouse are in transition.”11
Further definitional fluidity is introduced by judicial interpretation
of one portion of the statutory definition of “spouse,” namely, the
phrase “cohabited . . . continuously for a period of not less than three
years.”12 Astonishingly, a leading Ontario court has held that this does
not require living together for three years. The court in Sullivan v.
Letnik held that continuity of cohabitation was established across a
app. (Ont. C.A.).
6
[1998], 39 R.F.L. 4th 361, ¶ 6 (Can. Ont. General Div.) (citing Molodowich v. Penttinen [1980], 17 R.F.L. 2d 376 (Can. Ont. Dist. Ct.)).
7
Though one question on the court’s list was “[w]hat were their feelings towards each
other?” Id. ¶ 6 item (ii)(c).
8
Fidelity, however, was included, as reflected in a question: “Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?” Id. ¶ 6 item (ii)(b) (under the heading “Sexual and Personal Behaviour.”). Note the implication that fidelity is attitudinal, rather than a matter of belief or obligation.
9
[1994] 5 R.F.L. 4th 313 (Ont. Unified Fam. Ct.), rev’d in part on other grounds, [1997]
27 R.F.L. 4th 79 (Ont. C.A.) (applying a statute in effect prior to the Family Law Act discussed
above). See Perkovic v. McClyment, [2008] 57 R.F.L. 6th 57 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (ascribing
spousal status to a man who was married to someone else). The caselaw on these issues is discussed in MARY JANE MOSSMAN, FAMILIES AND THE LAW IN CANADA 510 (2004).
10
In Mahoney, the court made this conclusion fairly explicit:
It appears from the caselaw that parties may cohabit within the meaning of the Family
Law Act when one party is still legally married to another. In Sullivan v. Letnik,
Beckett found: “I am of the opinion that the parties cohabited in a conjugal relationship after June 2nd, 1981, and certainly since January 2nd of 1985 when the applicant
and her husband formally separated. The relationship was continuous from that time
until March 1992.
[1998] 39 R.F.L 4th ¶ 7 (internal citation omitted) (citing Letnik, [1994], 5 R.F.L. 4th ¶ 23).
11
Mahoney, [1998] 39 R.F.L. 4th ¶ 26.
12
Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, § 29.
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lengthy time period when Mrs. Sullivan refused even to set foot on the
love nest—a boat called the Jadrin—“because of the business turmoil
between them and her fear of violence.”13 The court noted “that did
not mean that the relationship had terminated. * * * * Whether
couples are separated is a question of intent, not geography; at least
one of the parties must intend to permanently sever the relationship.”14
The fluidity of Ontario law as to the definition of “spouse” impedes judgment on related matters. In Rosenberg v. College of Physicians & Surgeons,15 a physician whose license was revoked owing to
his having had sexual relations with a patient advanced as a defense
the allegation that the patient was also his spouse. The prohibition of
sexual relations with a patient was subject to no express spousal exception, but common sense might require that one be inferred. Surely
the drafters did not intend to prohibit sexual relations between husband
and wife. Dr. Rosenberg’s patient, however, was not his wife. Dr.
Rosenberg maintained that owing to cohabitation she was nevertheless
his spouse. The court rejected this defense, and refused to infer the
spousal exception on the grounds that “the term ‘spouse’ has no clear
definition in law” and that “‘spousal relationship’ means one thing in
one context and something quite different in another,”16 so that the
proposed exception would “open a significant hole” in the disciplinary
requirements.17 After this decision, it remained unclear whether a physician in Ontario who afforded medical treatment to his wife (or to her
husband) might also engage in marital sexual relations.18
These legal provisions reflect a disorder not only of doctrine but
13

[1994] 5 R.F.L. 4th 313 ¶ 23.
Id. ¶¶ 23–24; see also Stephen v. Stawecki,[2006], 32 R.F.L. 6th 282 (Ont. C.A.), affirming [2005], 32 R.F.L. 6th 273 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Sturgess v. Shaw [2002], 31 R.F.L. 5th
453 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J); Mahoney, [1998], 39 R.F.L. 4th ¶ (“[P]arties may be found to be cohabiting, even if they maintain separate residences.”). A further point about the Ontario definition
of “spouse” is that by its terms it applies only to Part Three of the Family Law Act (“Support
Obligations”). The term “spouse” is extensively used throughout the act (as of course are terms
which would normally be cognates, such as marriage, family, and so on), but outside of Part
Three the term “spouse” is not explicitly subject to the extended definition quoted above. It
seems you may be a spouse for some purposes but not for others.
15
Rosenberg v. Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons of Ont., [2006], 216 O.A.C. 358 (Ont.
C.A.).
16
Id. ¶ 40. The court attached an appendix that charted the varying definitions under
twenty-six Ontario statutes and regulations.
17
Id. ¶ 42 (characterizing the reasoning of the disciplinary committee). The court did
leave open the possibility that some exception along those lines might later be identified, stating
that “the legislation may leave some scope for finding that the [medical-disciplinary] . . . regime
does not apply to certain relationships.” Id. ¶ 44.
18
It might be doubted whether he could even touch her (or she him), or suggest making
love at some future date, since even “touching of a sexual nature” and “behavior or remarks of a
sexual nature” were prohibited. Id. ¶ 6.
14
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also of what might be termed “legal cognition.” They are objectionable not only on the directly consequentialist ground that they may forbid or penalize what should be encouraged, and might encourage what
should be forbidden, but also on the grounds that they reflect a legal
system which, at least in some instances, “doesn’t know what it is
talking about,” or at least neglects to think carefully and in a sustained
way about its terminology and doctrines. They display a disorder as
regards recognition.
III. THE NATURE OF RECOGNITION
What is recognition? What is involved, for example, in recognizing one’s condition as a married man or woman; or in a society’s recognition of marriage or the parent-child relationship?19
The Greek term is anagnôrisis. Anagnôrisis is knowledge of a sort
that involves assessment—the exercise of judgment—the forming of a
conclusion as to what the data really mean, what they add up to, and
what they may import. Recognition is an achievement.
Recognition displays two or three facets. The first is achieved by
looking into the thing whose recognition is at issue; and the second is
developed through looking outward or “around” the thing, determining, so to speak, where it is located—where it fits in. Recognition of a
person, for example, has an anthropological aspect and also a social
aspect—it entails thinking about who that person is, and indeed perhaps what persons are, and it usually entails thinking about affiliations
such as friendships and discerning socially recognized roles. Recognizing a person as a husband or a wife, for example, will involve identifying the person and his or her history and commitments and also deploying an understanding of the nature of marriage.
Recognition of the person may also involve a moral and a juristic
aspect. It may call for an acknowledgment of the merits or demerits of
the person’s way of life, an identification of his social or legal location
as an honorable person or a miscreant, and an identification of the
person’s special roles and of the goods which those roles serve or neg19
There is an interesting discussion of various senses of “recognition” in chapter two of
PATHCEN MARKELL, BOUND BY RECOGNITION (2003), but none of the major meanings there
identified fully corresponds to the meaning developed here. For example, the account here is not
limited to retrieved knowledge, as when one recognizes a friend: Oedipus does not retrieve old
knowledge when he recognizes that he has killed his father. Further, the account here is not limited to knowledge that implies respect: although the term recognition, as in the phrase “public
recognition,” often does imply respect, this is not always the case (certainly Oedipus’ selfrecognition did not enhance his self-respect). Further, the account presented in this article is not
about recognition in a performative sense, as when the chair recognizes a speaker.
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lect. In tragic drama, it may involve a recognition of the incipience of
retribution, as when Macbeth recognizes the fulfillment of prophecy
when he hears that Birnam Wood is moving towards Dunsinane.
Altogether, recognition is a fairly complex project, and sometimes
a deep one. Recognition is accomplished when the person arrives at a
settled acknowledgment of the situation by adducing his wisdom: his
accumulated, settled insights into how things are, how they are related, and how they are to be understood.
Recognition takes on a special character when one’s self—the recognizing person—is the person to be recognized. The project then involves the self in a special way (we might call it “reflexive recognition”). As with other forms of recognition, this sort often involves
recognition of relationships. It rests upon judgments as to “where one
belongs” or “what one belongs to” or, more importantly still, whom
one belongs to (family and country, for example). Furthermore, recognition of self entails recognition of where one stands morally. This
is the case, for example, when one recognizes one’s duties as a husband or wife, or when one recognizes one’s parents and the obligations one has to them. In all such projects, reflexive recognition can
plumb the depths of the heart. It may involve, as Aristotle states in the
Poetics, “a change from ignorance to awareness of a bond of love or
hate.”20
As all of this may suggest, the most difficult, the darkest, the most
tragic projects are those which lead to recognition of the self as morally flawed and as complicit in flawed affiliations, especially those of a
familial or pseudo-familial nature.
IV. THE TRAGEDY OF OEDIPUS THE KING
The classic recognition episode in Greek tragedy unfolds in Oedipus the King, as Oedipus gradually realizes, to his horror, that the
man he killed some years previously in a conflict at a crossroads was
in fact his own father, Laius, and that the woman he subsequently
married was also his own mother, Jocasta. The story is familiar: King
Laius, frightened by a prophecy that he would one day be slain by his
own son, sought the death of Oedipus in infancy; and Oedipus was
therefore given over to die by exposure to the elements, abandoned on
a mountain with his feet pinioned together. Rescued, Oedipus was
raised by the king and queen of another country—Polybus and his
wife—who concealed the fact that they were not his biological parents.
20

ARISTOTLE, Poetics, supra note 2, at 2324.
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When he grew older, Oedipus heard a prophecy that he was destined to kill his own father. Fleeing the kingdom to avoid this fate, he
met a stranger at a crossroads—a stranger who was in fact his father,
Laius, although Oedipus did not recognize him. (How could he have
done? Any stranger might have been his father.). In a brawl, Oedipus
killed this stranger, fulfilling part of the prophecy. As events then unfolded, he married Jocasta, although again Oedipus did not, of course,
recognize her as his mother. (How could he have done? Any woman
could have been his mother.).
All of this sets the scene for the horrible events which bring the
tragic truth to light, as the prophet Teiresias, a messenger, and then a
shepherd divulge piecemeal the events of Oedipus’ family history,
gradually making them evident despite Oedipus’ resistance and his efforts to confabulate alternate interpretations.
The extreme power of this drama—the awe and horror that it
evokes in every age, including our own—calls for some explaining.
After all, how likely is it that similar events could occur today? Our
contemporaries do not practice infanticide, nor do they expose their
infants or hand them over to nameless shepherds, and thus do not risk
the unexpected survival into adulthood of a child ignorant of his biological origins—not for precisely the reasons that applied in Oedipus’
case anyway, though abortion is widely practiced in modern society.
A modern Sophocles might pen the drama of a baby who survives a
late-term abortion, and unbeknownst to the mother, is rescued by a
merciful nurse, is placed for adoption through a pregnancy help shelter, and is raised by an adopting couple who conceal the fact that they
are not the biological parents. Alternatively, this playwright might depict the case of someone whose biological mother has used the services of a surrogate to bear the child to maturity and then refused to accept the child as her own, concealing her identity thereafter, as the
confidentiality laws of some jurisdictions would permit.
Further modern parallels are suggested by the generation-crossing
confusions in Oedipus’ family. Jocasta’s children with Oedipus were
also her grandchildren. Oedipus’ children with Jocasta were also his
half-brothers and half-sisters.21 Professor Margaret Somerville has recently reported a Canadian case in which the grandmother of a baby
was also its mother: she was the biological grandmother and also be21
See SOPHOCLES, Oedipus the King, in SOPHOCLES: THE THEBAN PLAYS 1, 21 lines
455–58 (David Grenetrans., 1994) [hereinafter Oedipus the King (Grene trans.)]:
He shall be proved father and brother both
To his own children in his house, to her
that gave him birth, a son and husband both . . . .
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came, because she assisted her daughter’s pregnancy by carrying the
embryo to term, the surrogate mother.22
Oedipus the King is a drama about unfolding knowledge.23 It reflects that familiar, deeply human experience which leads beyond current developments and brings to light the clues to the hidden past.24 It
is a drama about how the search for knowledge can be distorted and
how it can miscarry.
Oedipus the King is also a tragedy of ignorance of family. It is a
tragedy of nonrecognition of fundamental familial relationships. The
“recognition tragedy” of Oedipus unfolds because of the disordered
condition of his birth family, the disruption of the natural evolution of
familial recognition, and the rupture, owing to his abandonment by
Laius and Jocasta, of the natural development of the relationship between parent and child. It is this circumstance that is the basis for the
question posed to Oedipus by the prophet Teiresias quoted at the beginning of this article:
Dost know thy lineage? Nay, thou know’st it not,
And all unwitting art a double foe
To thine own kin, the living and the dead.25
It is owing to our being acknowledged by our parents, kept by our
parents, and raised by our parents, that we recognize our parents. This
recognition is founded on their being recognizable: in other words, being members of a category (mother, father, parent) whose borders
have not been hopelessly blurred.
It is owing to practices of familial recognition that we learn the art
of recognition. Family life: its intimacy across the years, the opportunities it affords for candid discussion and for the observation of the
unfolding effects of speech and action—sustains, as no other circumstances can, conditions conducive to the most comprehensive sorts of
22
Margaret Somerville, When Granny Gives Birth to Her Grandson, Something’s Wrong,
GLOBE & MAIL, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/whengranny-gives-birth-to-her-grandson-theres-something-wrong/article1913695/ (last visited Feb. 22,
2011).
23
Cf. Charles Segal, Introduction to Oedipus the King, in SOPHOCLES: THE THEBAN
PLAYS xi, xxiii (David Grene trans., 1994), supra (noting various puns and double entendres on
Oedipus’ name, several of which involve the term “know” and cognates).
24
See Charles Segal, Life’s Tragic Shape: Plot, Design, and Destiny, in BLOOM’S
MODERN CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS: SOPHOCLES’ OEDIPUS REX 205, 213 (Harold Bloom ed.,
updated ed. 2007) (“The Oedipus is almost unique among Greek tragedies in telling its story in
reverse. Nearly every crucial event in the action has already happened. The action is therefore
almost all retrospective action – that is, it depicts how the characters (and the spectators too) see
and understand in the present events that took place in the past.”).
25
Oedipus the King (Storr trans.), supra note 1, at 41, lines 417–20.
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recognition. In our parents’ eyes we better recognize ourselves, day
by day. In family life, we initiate the continuous review of self which
is thereafter sustained by thoughtful persons throughout their lives.
The faculties of reason that underlie recognition—memory, discernment and judgment—take root and grow first in that seedbed of the
cognitive virtues.
In Oedipus the King, Sophocles places his hands upon cords which
wind into the very heart of the human condition. First, he touches
upon the sacrality of the family bond. The tragedy of Oedipus reflects
the circumstance that family and familial recognition make us what we
are. Oedipus the King also portrays the curses of familial failure—or,
putting the matter in a more modern way, the lasting, lifelong, transgenerational effects (sometimes even the fatal effects) that ensue when
familial bonds are disrupted, distorted or corrupted.
V. RESPONSES AND REACTIONS TO OCCASIONS FOR TRAGIC
RECOGNITION
What may be the alternatives available to one who is gradually
confronted by the unfolding of a tale that invites unpleasant recognition, especially recognition of one’s self in one’s most intimate, familial affiliations? What might ensue when recognition may embrace
the sad, the delictual, the bad, and the disgraceful? What follows upon
that which is termed, in Oedipus the King, the “terrible speech . . .
[the] terrible hearing?”26
I present two alternatives: some people face it, and some refuse to
face it. Some people apprehend the truth as it comes to light, clearly
discern its unwelcome implications as they unfold, and unflinchingly
acknowledge the conclusions that inevitably must be drawn. So also do
some societies and their legal systems face the unpleasant facts. Other
people and societies evasively seek ignorance or, if necessary, go so
far as to blind themselves to the truth.
The first line of response is exemplified by King David, who has
(like Oedipus) committed a dreadful contravention of the laws of conjugal morality, and who also is made to listen to terrible words:

26
Oedipus the King (Grene trans.), supra note 21, at 50, lines 1169–70:
“HERDSMAN: O God, I am on the brink of frightful speech.
“OEDIPUS: And I of frightful hearing, But I must hear.”
The Greek here translated “frightful” is “δευνω,” and can be translated “terrible,” which
is why that word is used in the text, supra.
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Late one afternoon, David rose from his couch and strolled on the
roof of the royal palace; and from the roof he saw a woman bathing.
The woman was very beautiful, and the king sent someone to make
inquiries about the woman. He reported, “She is Bathsheba daughter
of Eliam [and] wife of Uriah the Hittite.” David sent messengers to
fetch her; she came to him and he lay with her. . . .
David wrote a letter to Joab . . . as follows: “Place Uriah in the
front line where the fighting is fiercest; then fall back so that he may
be killed.” So . . . Joab . . . stationed Uriah at the point where he
knew that there were able warriors. The men of the city sallied out
and attacked . . . Uriah the Hittite was among those who died.
....
But the LORD was displeased with what David had done, and the
LORD sent Nathan to David. He came to him and said, “There were
two men in the same city, one rich and one poor. The rich man had
very large flocks and herds, but the poor man had only one little
ewe lamb that he had bought. He tended it and it grew up together
with him and his children: it used to share his morsel of bread, drink
from his cup, and nestle in his bosom; it was like a daughter to him.
One day, a traveler came to the rich man, but he was loath to take
anything from his own flocks or herds to prepare a meal for the
guest who had come to him; so he took the poor man’s lamb and
prepared it for the man who had come to him.”
David flew into a rage against the man, and said to Nathan, “As
the LORD lives, the man who did this deserves to die! He shall pay
for the lamb four times over, because he did such a thing and
27
showed no pity.” And Nathan said to David, “That man is you!”

This last, dreadful pronouncement bears some distant likeness to a
statement uttered by Teiresias to Oedipus:
I say you are the murderer of the king
Whose murderer you seek.28

It springs the trap.
David and Oedipus are both kings. Each presides, as he believes,
over an inquiry into a severe wrong. Each, when the trap springs, is
27
28

2 Samuel 11:2–12:7 (The Jewish Study Bible, 2004).
Oedipus the King (Grene trans.), supra note 21, at 35, lines 362–63.
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obliged to identify himself as the culprit he seeks. David and Oedipus
respond in different ways, however, and can therefore serve as illustrations of two alternate roads that may be followed after such a discovery.

A. The Davidic Response
David admits his guilt.29 He offers no excuses and in no way obscures or distorts the insight that Nathan has demanded of him. The
Lord punishes him with the mortal illness of his son. David fasts,
weeps, prays, and deeply repents. The child dies. David seeks confirmation of his son’s death. Having acknowledged his sin, he can recognize this as his just punishment. He ceases to fast and goes on with
his life.30 He is thoroughly realistic. He recognizes the situation for
what it is.
David’s recognition has social and political aspects. When the
child dies, the servants fear to reveal it.31 David insists on learning the
truth. He asks; they tell him.32 David insists on recognizing the truth
when others would connive at concealing it.When David ceases to
fast, his courtiers ask for an explanation and he gives one:
While the child was still alive, I fasted and wept because
“Who knows? The LORD may have pity on me, and the
live! But now that he is dead, why should I fast? Can I
back again? I shall go to him, but he can never come back

I thought:
child may
bring him
33
to me.”

David emerges as one who, as great heads of state in crises often
do, depicts the course and culmination of a crisis with bold strokes,
encouraging and promoting clarity of recognition. David goes even
further than most of the great and displays recognition of his own merited distress. Such a leader promotes, in his nation, practices of honest and clear social recognition. He promotes—as do the Davidic
Psalms—appreciation of the law.

29

2 Samuel 12:13 (The Jewish Study Bible, 2004) (“David said to Nathan: ‘I stand guilty
before the Lord!’”). The notes to this edition of the Bible invite the reader to compare the evasive comments of Saul when Samuel convicts him of disobedience to the Lord in 1 Samuel 15.
30
The narrative in this paragraph is based on 2 Samuel 12:13–23 (Jewish Study Bible,
2004).
31
Id. at 12:18 (“‘[H]ow can we tell him that the child is dead? He might do something
terrible.’”).
32
Id. at 12:19.
33
Id. at 12:22.
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B. The Oedipal Response
The second line of response to an occasion for recognition—to the
“terrible speech” and the “terrible hearing”—may be exemplified by
Oedipus, who (after evasive strategies designed to deflect knowledge
of the awful truth) cannot bear what comes into view. He blinds himself. The deepest horror of the tragedy of Oedipus lies not in his unknowing attack on his own family, but rather in his attack on himself—his attack on his own ability or willingness to see and
understand—his attack on recognition itself.
Oedipus’ responses, like David’s, have social and political aspects.
As did David, so does Oedipus encounter discouragement and resistance from those who think it better that he not learn the truth. Teiresias and the Old Shepherd must have the facts dragged out of them.
Jocasta, in what are almost her last words to Oedipus, promotes existential ignorance: “mayst thou ne’er discover who thou art!”34
Oedipus blinds himself—according to one interpretation—so that in
the next world, when he encounters Laius and Jocasta in the Stygian
fields, he will not have to bear the sight of their horrified gaze.35 He
cannot bear their recognition of the circumstances any more than he
can tolerate his own. He asks Creon to banish him to a place where
no one will ever speak to him again.36 The avoidance of recognition is
a widespread policy of those in Oedipus’s Thebes and, unlike David,
Oedipus promotes this doomed effort for a long time.

C. Social and Legal Responses
The position of a disordered society before the law can rightly be
compared to the position of David before Nathan or Oedipus before
Teiresias. A society, like a king, may be confronted with the occasion
for reflexive recognition with likely unpleasant results, and may, similarly, be required to choose between two alternatives. One alternative
is to face up to the situation, like David; the other is to deny, avoid or
in some other way escape the intolerable gaze of familial authority and
the pronouncements of law. A disordered society that persists in
34
35

Oedipus the King (Storr trans.), supra note 1, at 99, line 1069.
See id. at 125, lines 1373–75, in which Oedipus states:

“. . . [H]ad I sight, I know not with what eyes
I could have met my father in the shades,
Or my poor mother . . . .”
36
See Oedipus the King (Grene trans.), supra note 21, at 59, line 1437 (“to where I may
not hear a human voice.”).
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shameful practices will inevitably seek a course that seems to achieve
the latter results.
Of course society has no physical eyes to put out, nor can it seek
the sentence of banishment to some foreign lands. It can, however,
metaphorically put out its own eyes and deafen its ears by diminishing
its capacity to see the truth clearly and by refusing to listen. It can
suppress those who would display the truth and distort the language
and linguistic practices of those who might report it. It may, for example, define the terms used in its statutes and judicial authorities to
the point of incoherence.
A miscreant who is a private individual, or but one official, may
think it necessary to flee the law and its oracles; but miscreants who
are themselves the guardians of the social order—the parents and the
judges: the keepers of the law—seem to have the power to evade recognition by distorting the law itself. They may, with tragic results, interfere with the, so to speak, seriousness or gravitas of legal discourse—with the firmness of the law, the discernment of the law, the
vocabulary or the terminology of the law, what we might almost term
the “eyes” of the law—and thus with the law’s capacity for recognition.

